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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ARBITRABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Andrey Kotelnikov∗ 
Abstract 
This article, through an overview of international experience, 
considers the interplay between economic sanctions and 
international commercial arbitration, in particular, the effect of 
sanctions on the arbitrability of disputes and the public policy 
exception. Both arbitrability and public policy have previously been 
used to address the sanctions issue in arbitration, and the courts will 
likely have to deal with them again in the future. The article argues 
that any impact of sanctions on arbitrability of disputes is unjustified, 
but the use of public policy as a ground to challenge awards and to 
refuse their recognition and enforcement, as well as to invalidate 
arbitral agreements, has to remain the primary tool of control for the 
competent national courts. It also considers how, in the atmosphere 
of high foreign policy tension, even a court decision to recognise and 
enforce an arbitral award does not always guarantee the payment of 
an award debt. Where an an overseas government subject to 
economic sanctions is involved in such a case, this raises a host of 
additional questions related to sovereign immunity, and may provide 
other creditors of that state with additional opportunities for the debt 
recovery. 
Keywords: enforcement; setting aside; arbitral awards; sanctions; 
arbitrability; public policy 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past few decades, economic sanctions became the 
policy tool of choice for many governments and multinational bodies. 
                                                          
∗ Andrey Kotelnikov is Lecturer in the Law School, Robert Gordon University (Aberdeen, UK). 
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Restrictive measures of this kind not only promote the relevant 
foreign policy objectives, but also influence the functioning of dispute 
resolution in international commerce, particularly the mechanism of 
international commercial arbitration, as well as the rights and 
obligations of parties and arbitral institutions. Such influence may 
come in many forms. For example, the resolution of a dispute in an 
arbitral institution may depend on obtaining a licence from the 
competent authorities so that a party from a sanctions list could 
legitimately transfer the money to pay an administrative fee. 
Individuals named on a sanctions list could be unable to enter the 
territory of a foreign State to testify as witnesses (which, however, 
would not preclude the tribunal from holding a hearing in another 
country for this particular purpose). The list of potential procedural 
hurdles can be fairly long. From a wider perspective, the debates are 
ongoing in the literature as to whether, and to what extent, the 
emergence of sanctions regimes influences the popularity of certain 
arbitral seats on an international scale.1  
One of the most interesting recent examples of sanctions 
affecting commercial law and dispute resolution involves the 
relationship between Russia and the majority of Western countries. 
Following the events in Ukraine and subsequent political 
developments in 2014-2019, a number of countries – in particular, 
the United States (US) 2 and the European Union (EU) 3 – adopted 
restrictive measures targeting economic relations with Russia. Some 
countries joined the sanctions regime, while the others did not. In 
                                                          
1 Olga Boltenko, ‘Hong Kong Emerges as Russia’s Refuge While the EU’s Sanctions Cripple Major Russian 
Businesses’ <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/11/24/hong-kong-emerges-as-russias-
refuge-while-the-eus-sanctions-cripple-major-russian-businesses> accessed 15 November 2019; Russian 
Arbitration Association, ‘Russian Arbitration Association Survey: The Impact of Sanctions on Commercial 
Arbitration’ (2016) <http://arbitrations.ru/upload/medialibrary/e1e/2016-raa-survey-on-sanctions-
andarbitration.pdf> accessed 15 November 2019. 
2 For the review of the measures in question, see: The US Department of State, ‘Ukraine and Russia Sanctions’ 
< https://www.state.gov/ukraine-and-russia-sanctions> accessed 15 November 2019. 
3 For the review of the measures in question, see: ‘EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine’ 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine> accessed 




turn, the Russian Federation reacted by introducing its own counter-
measures targeting the economic relations with the sanctioning 
states.4 As a result, more and more actors in international trade are 
finding themselves in a position where the continued existence of 
restrictive measures may influence their rights and obligations 
arising out of commercial contracts, as well as the resolution of their 
disputes with trade partners. The interest in sanctions is also growing 
in Russian legal academia and among the legal profession.5 Since the 
coverage of these developments for the English-speaking readership 
remains limited, the following discussion will specifically note, where 
appropriate, the relevant legal position of Russia and Russian law, 
alongside its international counterparts. 
From an arbitrator’s perspective deciding whether and to what 
extent effect should be given to any set of overriding mandatory rules, 
inconsistent regulation in different countries can present quite a 
dilemma. International commercial arbitration is a jurisdictional 
legal process carried out by private individuals, the arbitrators. The 
arbitral tribunal typically has to take into account the parallel 
existence of several applicable laws at once. These include the 
substantive law applicable to commercial relations between the 
parties, the procedural law that governs the resolution of a dispute in 
arbitration (lex arbitri), the laws of countries where the winning 
party might seek enforcement of an arbitral award, and other laws 
with which the dispute has a significant connection.6 When these 
                                                          
4  See, in particular, the Federal Law of 4 June 2018 No.127-FZ ‘On Measures (Countermeasures) against 
Unfriendly Actions of the United States of America and Other Foreign States’; the Decree of the President of 
Russian Federation of 6 August 2014 No 560 ‘On the Application of Certain Special Economic Measures to 
Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation’ (restricting the import into Russia of certain agricultural 
products originating in the countries that imposed sanctions on Russia); and the Decree of the President of 
Russian Federation of 22 October 2018 No 592 ‘On Special Economic Measures in Connection with Ukraine’s 
Unfriendly Actions towards Citizens and Legal Entities of the Russian Federation’ (introducing restrictive 
measures against certain enumerated individuals and legal entities of Ukraine, including the blocking 
(freezing) of their bank accounts and other property in Russia and a ban on withdrawal of capital from Russia). 
5 See, e.g., this sizeable collection of articles: Ekonomicheskie sanktsii protiv Rossii: pravovye vyzovy i 
perspektivy (Sbornik statei) / Pod red. S.V. Glandina, M.G. Doraeva. Moscow, 2018. 
6 On the application of the law other than the law chosen by the parties, see, e.g., Article 11(5) of the Hague 




competing legal systems take the opposite views on the validity and 
legitimacy of a certain commercial transaction, the tribunal’s task 
becomes particularly complex. One should also bear in mind that 
resolution of disputes in international arbitration by definition has an 
international (or transnational) character, and arbiters are not 
bound by the provisions of national law to the same extent as judges.7  
The classic debate between the jurisdictional (procedural) and 
autonomous theories of arbitration8 becomes very pertinent where 
the arbitrators have to make a choice between application and non-
application of national mandatory rules, particularly the rules closely 
intertwined with international politics. From the vantage point of the 
autonomous theory and the delocalisation theory,9 it is logical to 
insist that such national regulations must not be directly binding for 
the tribunal, even where the seat of arbitration is in a country that 
adopts and enforces economic sanctions. Arbitrators should be free 
to deviate from such rules if, as a matter of law or legal policy, there 
is a good reason to do so. It had been pointed out that the state of the 
seat of the arbitration is not the same as a forum for a domestic 
court.10 The seat is merely a state whose procedural law governs the 
conduct of arbitral proceedings. An arbitral tribunal owes no 
allegiance to the state of its seat and is not under any legal obligation 
to uphold its laws and policies.11 
Other authors insist that merely because the parties selected 
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, it does not mean that 
they can thereby escape the application of any mandatory rules in a 
                                                          
7 See R Y Jennings, 'The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law' 
(1996) 45 Int'l & Comp LQ 1, 4. 
8 See. L.A. Lunts, N.I. Marysheva, Kurs mezhdunarodnogo chastnogo prava: Tom 3 (Moscow, 1976) 218 - 219; 
Arbitrazhnyi protsess: uchebnik / V.V. Yarkov, ed. (4th ed.,. Мoscow, 2010) 615; A.G. Kotelnikov, Pravovaya 
priroda arbitrazhnogo soglasheniya i posledstviya ego zaklyucheniya. Dis. … kand. yurid. nauk  (PhD thesis, 
The Urals State Law Academy, Ekaterinburg 2008) 56, 79. 
9 Hong-Lin Yu, ‘A theoretical overview of the foundations of international commercial Arbitration’, 1 Contemp. 
Asia Arb. J. (2008) 255; Kotelnikov (n 8) 62-63. 
10 Mercédeh Azeredo da Silveira, Trade Sanctions and International Sales (Kluwer 2014), 98. 





national system of law which they do not like. Choosing the applicable 
law, the parties choose it in its entirety, and if some rules within this 
system of law cannot be derogated from,  they will still apply to the 
parties’ relationship.12  The success of international arbitration 
stems, to a large extent, from the support of national governments, 
and if arbitration were to be seen as a means of evading legitimate 
regulation and policies, its reputation would suffer.13  In addition, 
arbitrators and administrative personnel of arbitral institutions are 
merely private individuals who in that capacity must comply with all 
the laws of the State of their residence. It would be imprudent to 
ignore this ‘personal’ dimension because the legislation on sanctions 
often imposes significant administrative and criminal penalties for 
non-compliance.  
It is submitted that these and other considerations resulting 
from application or non-application of sanctions regulations in any 
given dispute, important and complex in their own right, derive to a 
large extent from the possibility that a non-compliant award might be 
set aside, or its enforcement might be ultimately refused, by the 
competent national courts. But how often and in what circumstances 
have the national courts done so? Among the limited grounds for 
court intervention provided in the New York Convention 1958, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and 
various national statutes, two grounds stand out most prominently: 
arbitrability and public policy.  
Relying on the analysis of recent cases and developments, this 
article will consider, therefore, the effect of sanctions on the 
arbitrability of disputes and the public policy exception. It will 
address the following issues in turn: 
                                                          
12 A Philip, Mandatory Rules Public Law (Political Rules) and Choice of Law in the EEC Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligation (Holland Publishing House, 1982) 93. 
13 O Lando, ‘The Law Applicable to the Merits of the Dispute’, Arbitration International, 2(2) (1986) 104, 158. 
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1) The essence and types of economic sanctions, and the 
significance of various classifications for their effect on 
international commercial arbitration.  
2) The effect of sanctions on setting aside and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, particularly in the context of objective 
arbitrability and the treatment of sanctions as an element of 
public policy. 
 
2. Definition and diversity of economic sanctions 
In essence, economic sanctions, despite their effect on the 
private law sphere and the relations between private individuals and 
companies, are an instrument of foreign policy and an issue of the 
public international law. Their types are numerous. The most radical 
measure in the existing ‘arsenal’ is embargo, i.e. the prohibition of 
trade with certain States. The embargo may be total, that is, extend to 
any export-import transactions with the target country, or 
partial/sectoral when the restriction relates to certain goods or their 
categories, such as goods that serve military purposes and the dual-
purpose goods, i.e. the ones that have both military and civil uses. The 
boycott is a ban on imports of any goods or services from the target 
State. Like the embargo, the boycott may be total or partial. Still 
milder measures include, in particular, making certain commercial or 
financial transactions subject to prior permission or reporting; and 
the arrest (freezing) of assets held by the named persons on the 
territory of the host State. Selective restrictions may relate to 
economic transactions with certain named individuals or entities.14 
Sanctions usually reflect the political desire to induce a foreign 
State to perform, or to stop performing, some action or actions. Their 
specific objectives can be diverse: from forcing a State to cease some 
                                                          
14 E Geisinger and others, ‘The Impact of International Trade Sanctions on Contractual Obligations and on 
International Commercial Arbitration’ [2012] 4 International Business Law Journal 405, 406. 
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specific human rights violations on its territory to overthrowing of a 
political regime. The latter appears to be the most common motive. 
According to one study, in about every third case (80 out of 204 
instances examined by the authors), the sanctions’ goal was to change 
the political regime in the target country.15  
It is common to explain economic sanctions as an intermediate 
measure between words and military action16which is particularly 
useful when verbal condemnation is incapable of producing the 
desired effect, but the use of military force is impossible or 
inadequate. The mechanism of most categories of economic sanctions 
is indirect: their primary object, as a rule, is not the elite who take key 
decisions in the target State. Instead, the target is the members of the 
armed forces, the middle class, the workers of the agricultural sector, 
or the country’s population in general.17 As the UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan noted in his report, ‘when robust and comprehensive 
economic sanctions are directed against authoritarian regimes, a 
different problem is encountered.  Then it is usually the people who 
suffer, not the political elites whose behaviour triggered the 
sanctions in the first place. Indeed, those in power, perversely, often 
benefit from such sanctions by their ability to control and profit from 
the black market activity and by exploiting them as a pretext for 
eliminating domestic sources of political opposition.’18 There is no 
doubt that economic sanctions could lead to adverse social 
consequences in the State against which they are directed, including 
a devastating impact on public health, social care and other vital 
institutions.19 
                                                          
15 GC Hufbauer and others, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed. Peterson Institute 2007) 67. 
16 Jonathan Marcus, ‘Do Economic Sanctions Work?’ (BBC, 26 July 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-10742109> accessed 15 November 2019. 
17 J Kirshner, ‘The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions’ (1997) 6(3) Security Studies 32, 46. 
18 ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century. Report of the Secretary-General’, 
A/54/2000, 27 March 2000 <http://www.un.org/ru/documents/ods.asp?m=A/54/2000> accessed 15 
November 2019, para 231.  





Although there is recorded history of the use of economic 
sanctions (especially unilateral sanctions) against other countries 
since ancient times, their popularity peaked in the 20th century. 
According to one empirical study, from 1945 to 2005 there were 
1412 cases of their use, or threats of use, in the world, with the 
greatest number recorded in 1990-2000.20 At the end of the 20th 
century, the so-called comprehensive sanctions were most popular, 
well-known examples of which included the UN total embargo 
against Iraq, Kuwait and Libya. In the subsequent period, when their 
destructive nature and the extent of damage they caused to the 
economy and social well-being of the population became better 
understood, preference shifted to more narrowly targeted sanctions, 
with their effect limited to designated persons or sectors of the 
economy.21 
The latest generation of economic sanctions has also been 
termed ‘smart sanctions’,22 which generally includes targeted 
financial sanctions, arms embargoes, travel bans, and diplomatic 
restrictions.23 With such instruments, it becomes increasingly 
important to consider the exact wording of the regulations in every 
particular case; one cannot assume that the legal position will be the 
same as in any given other situation. This invites a particularly careful 
approach when comparison has to be drawn within the body of case 
law relying on broadly similar but differently worded sanctions 
regulations. As the international community accumulates the 
                                                          
20  TC Morgan, N Bapat, Y Kobayashi, ‘Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945-2005: Updating the 
TIES Dataset’ [2014] Conflict Management and Peace Science 2. 
21 ‘Follow-up to the Millennium Summit. The report of the UN Secretary General’, A 59/565, 2 December 2004 
(English version) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/536113/files/A_59_565-EN.pdf> accessed 15 
November 2019, para 79-80. 
22 See generally: Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft (D Cortright and G A Lopez, eds), Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002. 




experience of drafting sanctions instruments, the respective legal 
regimes mature, leaving fewer gaps and grey areas.24  
One typical provision in the latest generation of sanctions is the 
rule concerning an authorisation by a competent national body that 
may allow the applicant to perform an otherwise prohibited 
transaction. As opposed to a blank prohibition with no exceptions,25 
a common way of imposing a restriction has lately been to require an 
authorisation for a specified transaction or payment, where the 
prohibition can be implemented by a simple refusal of 
authorisation.26 The provisions of this nature regularly feature in 
arbitration and the related court cases. For example, they can make it 
necessary for an arbitral institution to submit the necessary 
exemption applications to the relevant authorities, e.g. for the 
payment of the institution’s fees.27 A court may extend the timelines 
for complying with its order in the proceedings to enforce an arbitral 
award, where such compliance necessitates a request for 
authorisation from a competent authority.28 A court (in particular, a 
US court) may draw a technical distinction between its judgment 
enforcing an arbitral award in favour of a sanctioned party under the 
New York Convention 1958 and making the sum in question available 
to that party, if the competent authority may still grant or refuse the 
authorisation to transfer the amount in question onwards from that 
party’s frozen bank account.29 
                                                          
24 Sergei Glandin, ‘Protsenty vzyskat', trebovaniya ne udovletvoryat' // Kak sanktsii vliyayut na pravo 
obratit'sya v mezhdunarodnyi arbitrazh’ (27 August 2019) 
<https://zakon.ru/blog/2019/08/27/procenty_vzyskat_trebovaniya_ne_udovletvoryat__kak_sankcii_vliyayu
t_na_pravo_obratitsya_v_mezhdunaro> accessed 15 November 2019. 
25 Such blank prohibitions appear in national legislation from time to time, although they are now relatively 
rare: see, e.g., the restrictions on trade with Eritrea in Section 69b of the German Regulation Implementing the 
Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulation – AWV) of 18 December 1986 as 
amended in 2010.  
26 J A Frowein and N Krisch, Germany, in: National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative 
Study (V Gowlland-Debbas, D L Tehindrazanarivelo, eds) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 237. 
27 Sections 105-108 of the LCIA Notes for Parties < https://www.lcia.org/adr-services/lcia-notes-for-
parties.aspx> accessed 15 November 2019. 
28 A v B [2019] 8 WLUK 82 (Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, 15 August 2019). 
29 Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 665 




The authors who analyse the position of arbitrators in their 
choice whether to apply a particular national (unilateral or 
multilateral) sanctions regime adopt a helpful framework calling for 
the determination, first and foremost, of the relationship between the 
law of the sanctioning state and the dispute at hand.30 Indeed, the 
tribunal must take into account a different set of circumstances 
where the sanctions are imposed by the state whose substantive law 
governs the dispute (with a further finer distinction as to whether the 
tribunal has to make the choice for the parties, or whether the 
contract contains the parties’ unequivocal choice)31; by the state 
where arbitration is seated; or the third state with which the dispute 
has a sufficiently close connection.32 To an extent, this theoretical 
distinction is helpful also in the present context, and worth bearing in 
mind when looking at the decisions of national courts analysing 
arbitrability and public policy in relation to sanctions. 
Further, it is important to distinguish between sanctions 
imposed by the UN Security Council decisions and all other types of 
economic sanctions. According to Art. 41 of the UN Charter, the 
Security Council is vested with the power to adopt the relevant 
measures. Article 25 of the Charter states that the members of the 
United Nations agree to accept the decisions of the Security Council 
and to carry them out. Therefore, the implementation of Security 
Council decisions is an international legal obligation for every UN 
Member State. 
In comparison with these UN sanctions, the use of restrictive 
economic measures by States unilaterally, as well as their use by 
members of an international organisation against third States, 
                                                          
30 See da Silveira (n 10), 106-126; T Szabados, ‘EU Economic Sanctions in Arbitration’, 35 Journal of 
International Arbitration 4 (2018) 439. 
31 See, in particular, the proposal for taking into account the timing of the imposition of sanctions by da Silveira 
(n 10) at 111. 
32 An example of such a close connection can be found in the ICC Award No 1859 (1973), where the tribunal 
took into account the Lebanese import restrictions in a dispute arising from a contract between a Japanese 
seller and a Lebanese importer governed by ‘the general principles and usages of international trade’. See also 
Yves Derains, ‘Le  statut des usages du commerce international devant les juridictions arbitrales’  (1973)  3 Rev  
Arb  1221. 
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produces no legally binding obligation for the target State. In the Final 
Report of the International Law Association (New Delhi, 2002), the 
regime of sanctions under the UN Charter is on the list of 
international obligations the violation of which can amount to a 
violation of public policy under Article V of the New York 
Convention.33 The report does not mention any other similar 
measures – perhaps because their status under the New York 
Convention is a more controversial issue. 
The attempts of a State targeted by UN sanctions to neutralise 
their effect through their domestic law seemed, so far, to be very 
controversial. For example, the 1990 Iraqi law ‘On the protection of 
property rights and interests of Iraq in the country and abroad’ 
stipulated that foreign companies and individuals who fail to comply 
with their contractual obligations because of the UN sanctions must 
pay appropriate compensation. Although the domestic courts of Iraq 
would enforce this rule, in international commercial arbitration the 
tribunals would probably refuse to give it effect, as this would be 
obviously inconsistent with the international public order.34 
With economic sanctions adopted in the framework of a 
regional international organisation, or by a single State, the 
identification of subjects legally bound to comply may present some 
challenges.  By their nature sanctions are territorial, that is, their 
provisions are binding only on natural and legal persons who, for one 
reason or another, are under the jurisdiction of the State enacting the 
sanctions. Despite the understandable political desire to improve the 
effectiveness of sanctions by expanding their reach, such an 
extension should have its limits. For example, the restrictions 
imposed by the EU Regulation 833/2014 of 31 July 2014,35 apply 
                                                          
33 P Mayer and A Sheppard, ‘Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International 
Arbitration Awards’ (2003) 19 (2) Arbitration International 256. 
34 Hans van Houtte, ‘Trade Sanctions and Arbitration’ (1997) 25 International Business Law 166. 
35 Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's 




within the territory of the EU; to any person who is a national of a 
Member State or incorporated under the law of a Member State; to 
any legal person in respect of business done within the EU.36 Thus, 
other persons not listed in the Regulation have no obligation to 
adhere to the restrictions it imposes.  
An example of an unsuccessful attempt to produce economic 
sanctions with an extraterritorial effect was the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (also known as the 
Helms-Burton Act), enacted in the US in 1996. The controversial Title 
III of this Act established a new cause of action in the US federal 
courts. Namely, the US citizens whose property was confiscated by 
the previous Cuban government without compensation received the 
right to lodge a claim against persons engaged in ‘unlawful 
trafficking’ of such assets. These ‘traffickers’ could include companies 
from the countries that retained trade relations with Cuba – which 
included, at that time, many countries of Western Europe, the UK, 
Mexico and Canada. For the trading companies, the probability of 
acquiring such property in the course of regular commerce was very 
high, as, in the early 1960s, the regime of Fidel Castro made a 
significant number of confiscations. In the US, those foreign 
companies engaged in trade with Cuba could face liability in the 
amount equal to the value of the respective property, and if they 
continued their ‘unlawful trafficking’ – in the amount equal to its 
triple value plus interest.37  
These provisions of the Helms-Burton Act were met with a 
widespread scepticism in the international community. The EU in the 
Regulation 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 declared the judicial 
decision and arbitral awards based on the Helms-Burton Act and 
similar extraterritorial acts unenforceable in the territory of its 
                                                          
36 Ibid., Article 13. 
37 Sec. 302 of the Act; A Lowenfeld, ‘Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act’ (1996) 90(3) The American 
journal of international law 419-434; V Lowe, ‘Helms-Burton and EC Regulation 2271/96’ (1997) 56 The 
Cambridge Law Journal 248-250. 
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Member States. This Regulation has also made it illegal for businesses 
and individuals to comply with such laws (including through 
compliance with requests of foreign courts). Further, it established 
the possibility of ‘reverse’ recovery, through the courts in the EU 
Member States, of losses incurred in the US under the provisions of 
the Helms-Burton Act and similar laws. The United Kingdom has 
introduced in its territory a criminal liability for violations of the EU 
Regulation 2271/96.38 In the UN Resolution 68/8 of 29 October 2013, 
the General Assembly expressed its concern with the UN Member 
States adopting acts such as the Helms-Burton Act the extraterritorial 
effects of which affect the sovereignty of other States, the legitimate 
interests of foreign citizens and organisations, freedom of trade and 
navigation.39  
However, the US did not abandon the idea of extra-territorial 
sanctions. A similar story has again unfolded in 2018 when the US 
withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran 
nuclear deal”) and re-imposed sanctions on this country. In response, 
the EU sought to protect its operators against the extraterritorial 
reach of the US sanctions by updating the EU’s Blocking Statute 
(Council Regulation No 2271/96).40 Thus, the EU companies doing 
business in and with Iran once again found themselves in a complex 
legal environment, where the extra-territorial US sanctions imposed 
on them one line of action, and the EU Blocking Statute required them 
to do the opposite. Recognising the dilemma, the above Regulation 
also allows EU operators who consider that non-compliance with a 
US requirement or prohibition could seriously damage their interests 
                                                          
38 Extraterritorial US Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of Trading Interests) 
Order 1996, SI 1996/3171. 
39 ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of 
America against Cuba’, Resolution A/RES/68/8  <http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/resolutions.shtml> accessed 
15 November 2019. 
40 ‘The Blocking Statute: protecting EU operators, reinforcing European strategic autonomy’ 




to apply to the Commission for an authorisation to comply with the 
US sanctions.41 
 
3. Challenge and enforcement of arbitral awards 
State courts’ control of international commercial arbitration is 
limited and carried out strictly within limits of the national law. Art. 
V of the New York Convention defines the grounds to refuse 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, which are uniform across all 
Contracting States of the Convention. The grounds for challenging an 
award at the seat of arbitration, on the opposite, are within the 
competence of every individual domestic legislature. To date, there is 
no international treaty governing the grounds for setting aside of 
arbitral awards in the country of their origin. 
At the same time, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration is an example of successful international 
harmonisation. It served as a model for the national statutory 
regulation in more than 70 States.42 Art. 34 of the Model Law listing 
the grounds for setting aside an award is identical to Art. V of the New 
York Convention. In non-Model Law countries, the list of grounds for 
challenging an award may differ. However, even in such jurisdictions 
(which include, among others, England and Scotland), the main ideas 
behind these grounds if not their wording has significant similarities 
to those established in the New York Convention. 
In those countries where the law permits the review of an award 
on the merits in some form, the court may verify the correctness of 
the tribunal’s approach, e.g. as to the validity or invalidity of a 
transaction, without resorting to arbitrability or public policy. For 
example, section 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides that, 
                                                          
41 Id. 
42 ‘Status of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration’ 




unless the parties agree otherwise, a party to arbitral proceedings 
may (upon notice to the other parties and the tribunal) appeal to the 
court on a question of law arising out of an award made in the 
proceedings. The court will grant the leave to appeal under this 
section if several conditions are present. First, the determination of 
the question must substantially affect the rights of one or more of the 
parties. Second, the question must be one which the tribunal was 
asked to determine. Third, according to the findings of fact in the 
award, the decision of the tribunal on the question must be obviously 
wrong, or it must be of general public importance, and the decision 
must be at least open to serious doubt. Finally, the court should be 
satisfied that despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the 
matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for 
the court to determine the question.43 This option is a specific feature 
of the English Arbitration Act; the UNCITRAL Model Law excludes the 
possibility to appeal an award on such grounds. 
In most countries, courts can consider economic sanctions from 
the standpoint of their impact on arbitrability of a dispute and their 
interpretation as matters of public policy, i.e. as grounds for setting 
aside or refusing recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. 
Art. V of the New York Convention and Art. 34 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law allow the court to scrutinise both of these grounds on its 
initiative, without the need for the parties to raise the issue and 
provide relevant evidence. 
 
3.1. Arbitrability of a dispute 
Arbitrability of a dispute defines which categories of dispute 
may be resolved by arbitration and which belong to the exclusive 
competence of the courts.44 According to Art. V (2) of the New York 
                                                          
43 For more details, see B Harris, R Planterose, J Teck, The Arbitration Act 1996: A Commentary (5th ed. 2014) 
357-374. 
44 N Blackaby and others , Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th ed., OUP 2015) 110. 
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Convention, the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award 
may be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that ... the dispute is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country. 
Art. 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration contains a similar provision. Some authors distinguish 
between objective arbitrability (in the meaning indicated above, also 
known as arbitrability ratione materiae), and subjective arbitrability 
which determines the ability of certain categories of persons to enter 
into arbitration agreements (arbitrability ratione personae).45 Such 
authors treat the impact of economic sanctions on the possibility of 
the referral of a dispute to arbitration as a separate issue covered by 
the rules of objective arbitrability.46 
The argument that the imposition of sanctions entails non-
arbitrability of disputes may proceed as follows. The arbitrators, 
being merely private individuals, have no authority to determine 
matters of public law. Issues relating to public policy should be 
resolved only by national or international courts where the decision-
making can consider not only the technical wording but also the 
political and legal motives behind the regulation. Moreover, 
arbitrators do not ‘belong’ to any particular national legal order. They 
must comply solely with the procedural law of the arbitral seat; they 
might be citizens of other States or stateless persons. The argument 
is essentially the same as the one used to exclude from the scope of 
international commercial arbitration the disputes involving 
mandatory rules of other nature, e.g. antitrust regulation, patents, 
and legislation on the securities market.47 
Nevertheless, already in 1999, the prominent French authors 
called this logic outdated.48 Indeed, if the tribunal simply resolves a 
                                                          
45 P Fouchard, E Gallard, B Goldman, On International Commercial Arbitration (New York, 1999) 313. 
46 Ibid 358-359. 
47 Blackaby (n 44) 112-116. 
48 Ibid 358. 
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dispute between parties in a commercial transaction, it is hard to see 
how the application of legal rules of whatever kind to this private 
controversy could have an adverse impact on public law and policy. 
If the remedy against the losing party in arbitration were solely the 
obligation to pay a sum of money, such a result would be perfectly 
consistent with the spirit of the arbitration agreement between the 
parties who from the very beginning agreed to refer their dispute to 
arbitration. Even if the tribunal employs an interpretation of the rules 
of public law different to that which the court might adopt, it does not 
change a lot. By entering into an arbitration agreement, parties accept 
that the interpretation of substantive law by the tribunal may be 
different from the approach of a competent court, but it will be final. 
This interpretation, regardless of its correctness on the merits, 
cannot be second-guessed by the national court (except under the 
provisions similar to section 69 of the English Arbitration Act).  
The jurisprudence of national courts broadly supports the 
arbitrability of disputes involving sanctions. In particular, the US 
courts strongly support this proposition, even in the context of the 
most stringent sanction regimes, such as the Cuban Assets Control 
Regulations.49 Likewise, the Swiss courts had been the consistent 
supporters of the same view over the years.50 In the famous case Air 
France v Lybian Airlines, the Quebec Court of Appeal has also ruled 
that the US sanctions against Lybia did not affect arbitrability of the 
dispute.51  
The dominant view among the commentators has also been that 
the dispute does not become non-arbitrable merely because it 
requires the tribunal to apply an economic sanction or other 
                                                          
49 Belship Navigation Inc v Sealift Inc, 1995 US DIST LEXIS 10541, 1996 AMC 209 (US District Court for the 
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overriding mandatory rules.52 It has even been suggested that the 
issue of arbitrability in this context is no longer a topic for a serious 
discussion.53 
One can think of at least two additional pragmatic arguments 
that might be used to justify the monopoly of State courts in the 
interpretation and application of the public rules on economic 
sanctions. First, the losing party may attempt to recover the sums it 
lost in arbitration as damages from the State authority that adopted 
economic sanctions, if they caused the non-performance or improper 
performance of the contract. However, the arbitral award will not be 
binding nor will it be res judicata for the relevant State authority. 
Therefore, all factual and legal aspects of the case will have to be 
reviewed again by a competent court, which is unlikely to uphold a 
claim if the imposition of sanctions was lawful. If the decision on the 
adoption of economic sanctions was in some way inconsistent with 
the law, recovery of damages from a public authority is nothing out 
of the ordinary. Such a mechanism exists in many countries, for 
example, under Art. 417 of the Russian Civil Code.  
Second, in theory, arbitration tribunal might order the losing 
party to perform some actions expressly prohibited under the 
sanctions regulation. However, for the implementation of this award, 
the winning party will need to obtain an enforcement order from an 
appropriate court. The judge will then be able to assess whether such 
a performance would be consistent with the law, and may refuse the 
enforcement on the grounds of public policy related to the remedy, 
rather than to the original arbitrability of a dispute between the 
parties. If the sanctions in question were not the UN Security Council 
measures, the decision would remain enforceable in third countries 
                                                          
52 Jean-Baptiste Racine, ‘L’arbitrage commercial international et les mesures d’embargo, 
A�  propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel du Québec du 31 mars 2003’, 134 JDI 89, 92 and 95– 101 (2004); Marc 
Blessing, Impact of the Extraterritorial Application of Mandatory Rules of Law on International Contracts 
(Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1999) 58-59. 
53 Mathias Audit, ‘L’effet des sanctions économiques internationales sur l’arbitrage international’, in L’ordre 
public et l’arbitrage, Actes du colloque des 15 et 16 mars 2013 (Dijon) 143 (LexisNexis 2014) at 147. 
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that chose not to accede to the sanctions regime. Where the losing 
party would be willing to comply with the award voluntarily, any 
actions prohibited by the sanctions would still remain illegal in the 
relevant countries. Again, it is hard to see a convincing argument 
against the arbitrability of the dispute here. 
A similar argument was, however, accepted by Italian courts in 
Societe Fincantieri Cantieri.54 In that case, three Italian companies 
and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense entered into contracts for the supply 
of warships. The contractual performance became impossible when 
in 1990 the UN Security Council Resolution established an embargo 
on shipments to Iraq. The contracts contained an arbitration clause, 
but the Italian companies filed a lawsuit with the Italian court arguing 
that because of the imposition of international sanctions on Iraq, the 
dispute became non-arbitrable. The trial court rejected this 
argument, but the Genoa Court of Appeal reversed the decision and 
held that the dispute could not be subject to arbitration according to 
Art. 806 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. This article provides 
that the parties may refer the disputes arising between them to 
arbitrators, except those disputes which may not be the subject of a 
settlement. The Court pointed out that the UN and the EU sanctions 
no longer allow the parties to dispose of their rights under the 
contract, and the submission of the dispute to arbitration can lead to 
a result expressly prohibited by international sanctions. The Court 
examined the case on the merits and ruled in favour of the Italian 
plaintiffs. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal in Paris refused to 
enforce this decision in France and criticised it, holding that the 
dispute was subject to arbitration, and the Italian court had no 
jurisdiction to hear it.55 
                                                          
54 Genoa Court of Appeal (Italy), 7 May 1994. 
55 Legal Department du Ministère de la Justice de la République d'Irak v Société Fincantieri Cantieri Navali 
Italiani, Société Finmeccanica et Société Armamenti E Aerospazio. 05/05404. (France, 15 June 2006, Cour 
d'Appel de Paris). For more details, see: Ivan Philippov, Yaraslau Kryvoi, ‘Russia's Mistral Deal under 
International Sanctions Will the Dispute be Arbitrable?’ (LexisPSL Arbitration, 3 October 2014). 
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A related case came before the ICC tribunal in Geneva in 1994. A 
Syrian citizen put forward a claim against two Italian companies, 
demanding the payment of an agency fee for the conclusion of 
contracts for the supply of military equipment to Iraq. The 
respondents argued that the dispute has become non-arbitrable 
because of the embargo. The interim award by a sole arbitrator 
rejected this argument and confirmed the tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
hear the case. The arbitrator pointed out that he did not doubt that 
the rules of national and international law, the existence of which the 
respondents indicated, can be regarded as a part of the international 
public order. However, the application of such rules by an arbitral 
tribunal and arbitrability of the claim are two different things. The 
mere fact that the arbitrator will be required to apply those or other 
public law rules in resolving the case does not mean that the dispute 
becomes non-arbitrable. An arbitrator is under an obligation to 
follow the requirements of the international public order but is not 
required, for this reason alone, to decline jurisdiction.56 The 
respondents challenged the interim award, but the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal agreed with the views of the sole arbitrator.57 Thus, even 
within this controversial line of cases, the majority of courts 
supported the arbitrability of the underlying dispute. 
However, the proposition that cases involving sanctions are 
arbitrable is not without reservations. In a series of cases involving 
the application of overriding mandatory provisions of the EU law and 
the law of its Member States, German, Austrian and English courts 
found it appropriate to strike down arbitration agreements where 
their tentative purpose was to escape the application of such 
mandatory rules.58  
                                                          
56Partial Award in Case No. 6719, JDI 1994, 1071-1081. 
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The German Federal Court of Justice ruled that an intention to 
avoid the application of German securities law was sufficient to 
justify the refusal to enforce both a choice of court agreement and an 
arbitration agreement.59 The OLG München held that if the choice of 
court in favour of Californian courts and the choice of Californian 
substantive law were designed to avoid the EU and German rules on 
the protection of commercial agents, such provisions will be treated 
as invalid. The court applied the same logic to arbitration 
agreements.60 In a similar case involving the EU Commercial Agents 
Directive,61 the Austrian OGH found that if the aim of an arbitration 
agreement was to disregard the mandatory provisions of the EU law, 
this would entail the invalidity of such an agreement.62 These 
decisions suggest that a similar logic would apply to arbitration 
agreements aiming to evade the sanctions regulation.63  
Likewise, in Accentuate Limited v ASIGRA Inc,64 Tugendhat J 
held that an arbitration agreement is null and void or inoperable in 
so far as it purports to require the submission to arbitration in 
Toronto, under Ontario law, of questions pertaining to mandatory 
provisions of the EU law, namely the Commercial Agents Directive. It 
is notable that this decision was made following an arbitration award 
where the arbitrator declined to apply the Directive. In Fern 
Computer Consultancy Ltd v Intergraph Cadworx & Analysis 
Solutions Inc,65 Mann J concluded that an English court was the 
proper place to determine the dispute involving the Commercial 
Agents Directive, and declined to give effect to the jurisdiction clause 
in favour of Texas courts in this context, where it was not sufficiently 
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clear that the alternative court would give effect to the Directive. 
Again, there is little doubt that the same approach would apply to 
cases involving sanctions. 
This line of authorities is not altogether surprising. As Jonathan 
Mance pointed out in his recent article,66 even the seminal US 
Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,67 so 
often hailed for its pro-arbitral stance, contained the following 
passage on the hypothetical possibility of enforcing a clause in favour 
of arbitration which would disregard the US mandatory rules: 
in the event that the choice-of-forum and choice-of-
law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of 
a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for anti-trust 
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning 
the agreement as against public policy.68 
These cases further reinforce the point already mentioned 
above: national governments and domestic courts will support 
arbitration only as long as they are reasonably confident that it will 
not be used as a mechanism of avoiding the application of mandatory 
rules, such as the economic sanctions.  
One may doubt, however, whether this line of cases should 
properly be considered under the heading of arbitrability. It is 
possible to adopt this approach,69 and the language of some of the 
decisions cited above is indeed broad enough for that. However, this 
does not accord with objective arbitrability of disputes as it is 
conventionally understood. Rather, what the courts seem to have 
done here was the case-by-case analysis of each arbitration 
agreement. The aim of the analysis was to determine whether the 
arbitration agreement violated public policy and, on this ground, was 
                                                          
66 J Mance, ‘Arbitral autonomy and applicable and overriding law’, Asia Pacific Law Review (2019) 1, at 10. 
67 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 
68 Ibid. at 636-637. 
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null and void. This approach may lead to a similar practical result as 
holding the disputes non-arbitrable, but it allows the courts to 
consider the unique facts in every case. Importantly, it avoids broad 
generalisations that a finding of non-arbitrability would entail. 
Where, having considered all the circumstances, the courts conclude 
that the arbitration agreement is likely to be used as a means of 
evading the mandatory provisions, such an agreement may be struck 
down. But if the parties satisfy the court that the arbitrators are likely 
to apply the relevant mandatory provisions, there should be no 
obstacle to referring them to arbitration as Article II of the New York 
Convention requires. 
 
3.2. Public policy 
According to Art. V of the New York Convention, recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that the recognition or enforcement of the award would 
be contrary to the public policy of that country. Art. 34 (2) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
contains a similar provision. 
The public policy exception acts as an ‘emergency brake’ that 
the State court may use when faced with an unacceptable award. 
Despite the broad wording of this exception, most experts agree that 
in the New York Convention, as well as in domestic arbitration law, 
one should interpret it with caution.70 Public policy must not be 
confused with public law; the former defines only the most basic, core 
values of the legal system.71 
                                                          
70 Marike R. P. Paulsson, The 1958 New York Convention in Action (Kluwer Law International, 2016) 225; 225; 
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If an arbitral award contradicts a prohibition of the relevant 
sanction, courts will have to face a question whether they should 
equate the interests of the State's domestic or foreign policy and the 
‘public policy’ as defined in the New York Convention. In the past, 
national courts usually drew a strict distinction and answered this 
question in negative, as exemplified in the US case Parsons & 
Whittemore Overseas Co.72 But how widely accepted is this liberal 
approach and does it always hold true today when national courts 
deal with cases involving economic sanctions? 
As discussed above, the International Law Association did not 
hesitate to include the UN sanctions on the list of international 
obligations the violation of which amounts to a breach of public policy 
under the New York Convention.73 However, the unilateral sanctions, 
such as those adopted by the US and the EU against Russia, or the 
Russian counter-sanctions, present more complex questions. 
In the EU, the Eco Swiss74 judgment of the CJEU established that, 
if a tribunal fails to apply the mandatory provisions of EU law, the 
courts of the arbitral seat can correct the position on review.75 The 
CJEU held that Article 81 of the EC Treaty (dealing with the 
competition and anti-trust rules) must be regarded as a matter of 
public policy. The same logic will, therefore, apply to the enforcement 
of foreign awards under the New York Convention.76 Since the EU 
sanctions by their nature are also mandatory provisions of the EU 
law, they would also be classified as a matter of public policy. The 
courts of the Member States have to apply overriding mandatory 
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provisions of the EU law ex officio, without either party having to 
raise the relevant objection.77 
In Russia, the courts consistently interpret both the UN Security 
Council sanction programmes and the Russian counter-sanction 
provisions as an element of public policy. For example, when a North 
Korean insurer applied to enforce an ad hoc award against a Russian 
company, the court in its 2019 ruling78has refused the enforcement. 
It relied on the US Security Council resolutions No 2270 of 2 March 
2016 and No 2321 of 30 November 2016 introducing sanctions 
against North Korea in connection with its nuclear programme, and 
the respective implementing Decrees of the President of Russian 
Federation.79 The court specifically referenced the sanction 
instruments’ provision prohibiting the payment or performance of 
any obligation in favour of North Korea or any natural or legal person 
of this country. It pointed out that the underlying transactions 
(insurance of seagoing vessels) were prohibited by the measures in 
question. It is remarkable that the court apparently concluded that in 
this case, the contracts giving rise to the claims in arbitration rather 
than the payment under the awards as such violated the sanctions.80 
Arguably, the decision could have been much clearer in many 
respects81 – but it was certainly a step forward for the court because 
when it heard the case for the first time (the initial ruling was 
overthrown by the cassation court and returned for reconsideration), 
sanctions did not even feature in the judgment text. 
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In another recent case, Ukrainian claimant obtained an arbitral 
award of the International Commercial Court at the Ukrainian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry against two Russian companies. 
Confirming the lower court’s decision to refuse enforcement of the 
award, the Commercial Court of the Moscow Circuit82 pointed out 
that the director of the applicant company was included in the 
sanctions list under the Presidential Decree of 22 October 2018 No 
592 ‘On Special Economic Measures in Connection with Ukraine’s 
Unfriendly Actions towards Citizens and Legal Entities of the Russian 
Federation’. It did not seem to matter much to the court that it was a 
director, not the company itself that was included on the list of 
sanctioned entities.83 Perhaps the argument was not put before the 
court, or the court was prepared to give the Russian sanctions 
regulations an extensive interpretation. 
The US courts are often hailed for their deferential approach 
when it comes to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
involving sanctions.84 According to the famous rule in Parsons & 
Whittemore Overseas Co., the notion of ‘public policy’ must be 
interpreted restrictively and the enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award may be refused on this ground only when it would violate the 
most basic concepts of morality and justice in the enforcing State. In 
that case, the award debtor relied on severance of diplomatic 
relations between the US and Egypt in connection with the Arab-
Israeli armed conflict. According to the defendant, they had to 
withdraw from the contract for reasons of solidarity with their 
country's policy. The Court of Appeal rejected these objections, 
pointing out that the national policy of the US and ‘public policy’ 
under the New York Convention are different categories which must 
not be confused with each other.85 
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Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc. 
was one of the rare occasions when the US court refused recognition 
and enforcement of an arbitral award on the grounds of public policy. 
In that case, the Iran Ministry of War and an American contractor 
signed a contract for the supply of military equipment. Iranian side 
handed over the communication equipment necessary for the 
contractual performance. Upon the introduction of sanctions against 
Iran, the performance of the contract became impossible, and the 
parties submitted the dispute to arbitration. Among other things, the 
resulting award stipulated that the contractor had to return the 
equipment to Iran. However, the equipment in question was the 
military radio; the contractor under the then-current US law could 
not export it to the State that ‘repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism.’ For this reason, the US District Court refused 
the enforcement of this part of the award, adding that ‘if these 
restrictions are lifted within a reasonable time after this Order is 
entered, then the defendants must return or make available the 
equipment as directed by the Award.’86 Iran appealed the decision, 
but on appeal, the parties settled the case. In this situation, indeed, it 
is hard to imagine that an act expressly prohibited by law could have 
received the support of US courts.87 
In a sense, the 2011 decision of the Court of Appeal for the Ninth 
Circuit in Ministry of Defense of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems takes 
an intermediate position between the two situations above. In this 
case, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and a US company entered into a 
contract for the supply of military navigation systems. In 1979, after 
the Iranian revolution, US sanctions had been imposed against Iran, 
prohibiting the export of equipment to Iran. The next instalment of 
sanctions also made all payments for the benefit of Iranian citizens 
and companies subject to authorisation by the relevant US public 
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authority. The arbitral tribunal held the hearings in Tehran, and in 
1997 made a final award ordering the contractor to pay damages. The 
case culminated in the 2011 Court of Appeal decision. Relying on the 
familiar rule in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., the court stated 
that considerations of foreign policy, which includes sanctions 
against Iran, are not identical to public policy, and agreed with the 
district court's confirmation of the award. Regarding restrictions on 
the payment in favour of the Iranian Government, the court pointed 
out that the confirmation of a foreign arbitral award is not the same 
as payment in cash. The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign 
Assets Control has the right to issue a license for the actual transfer 
of funds.88  Until it does so, or until the US lifts the sanctions against 
Iran, one solution could be that the money would remain in a special 
‘blocked’ account which neither of the parties will be able to access.89  
The commentators welcomed this decision as yet another 
confirmation that the US courts are committed to a narrow 
interpretation of the public policy exception.90 However, the actual 
transfer of funds in favour of the claimant – which is the ultimate goal 
for any disputant in arbitration – never ensued. In 2013, the District 
Court for the Southern District of California attached the Cubic’s 
award debt in favour of the third parties with claims against Iran.  
Following a few unsuccessful attempts by others,91 this happened in 
Ministry of Defense of Iran v Cubic Defense Systems and Jenny Rubin 
et al. 92 The case involved an application by several US citizens who 
had previously obtained US court decisions compensating them for 
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the damage resulting from acts of terrorism. The defendant in those 
previous cases was the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state supporter 
of terrorism. In the absence of Iran’s other assets in the US, the court 
found it possible to attach this debt.  
Thus, although on the face of it, the public policy exception was 
deemed inapplicable in Ministry of Defense of Iran v. Cubic Defense 
Systems and the US economic sanctions did not amount to a ground 
for refusing enforcement of an arbitral award, the outcome of the 
dispute seems perfectly compatible with the US foreign policy.  The 
money of a US corporation that supplied military equipment to Iran 
was used to compensate for the damage that American citizens 
suffered from terrorism. The winning party in the arbitration, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, spent more than a decade before the US 
courts but obtained no payment. 
The judgments utilized to attach the Cubic award deserve a 
closer look. The money which Cubic Defense Systems owed to Iran 
under the terms of the arbitral award amounted only to a fraction of 
Iran’s total debt to US citizens – victims of terrorism. Although Iran’s 
assets in the US would otherwise have been immune from execution, 
the classification of Iran as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ meant that 
they lost their claim to sovereign immunity. The US ‘terrorist 
exception’ was specifically introduced into the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act 197693 to deal with claims arising from overseas 
terrorist acts. Prior to 1996 when this exception appeared, the US 
courts have consistently held that the privilege of sovereign 
immunity could not be withdrawn on any ground when the acts in 
question, regardless of their atrocity, took place outside the US 
territory.94 The ‘terrorist exception’ remains unique to the US; the 
majority of other countries premise the exercise of jurisdiction over 
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a foreign state on some connection with the territory of the forum 
state.95 
The attachment of the Cubic award then became possible by 
virtue of another statutory provision enacted by the US Congress in 
2002. Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)96 
reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law ..., in every 
case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a 
terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or 
for which a terrorist party is not immune […], the blocked 
assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets 
of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) 
shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of 
execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent any 
compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has 
been adjudged liable. 
‘Blocked’ assets in the provision above include assets ‘seized or 
frozen by the US’ under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act.97 Overall, this legislative framework is rather peculiar. 
Commenting on the provisions of TRIA, a group of authors observed:  
Anything related to attachment of sovereign assets is 
confusing and persons must double and triple check 
legislation, regulations, and actual and pending 
amendments thereto. When terrorist debtor assets are 
involved, issues increase geometrically. This cautionary 
                                                          
95 R O'Keefe, CJ Tams and A Tzanakopoulos (eds.), The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and Their Property: A Commentary (OUP 2013) 210. 
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comment applies most particularly to the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act.98 
The English courts may soon have to deal with a similar 
question. In Ministry of Defence & Support for Armed Forces of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran v International Military Services Limited,99 
the Iranian Ministry of Defence (MODSAF) obtained two arbitral 
awards against a government-owned English company (IMS). The 
dispute arose out of contracts concluded in the 1970s and terminated 
after the Iranian revolution. By the time the awards were issued and 
the proceedings to set them aside in the Netherlands (the seat of 
arbitration) came to a conclusion, MODSAF had been added to the list 
of sanctioned entities under the relevant EU Council Regulation. As it 
follows from the judgment, the Ministry’s position was that there was 
no impediment to the English Court entering judgment in terms of the 
awards pursuant to sections 100-104 of the English Arbitration Act 
1996 (the provisions implementing the New York Convention).100 
Phillips J, in a judgment dealing with a separate matter arising from 
this case (that concerning the amount of interest under the awards), 
noted that whether the awards are enforceable in England as a matter 
of principle remains to be decided at a later date.101 At the time of 
writing, this central question has not yet been decided. 
This decision did, however, introduce some clarity into the 
English court’s position on EU sanctions. The central issue before 
Phillips J was whether the court should refuse enforcement of any 
post-award interest element of the Awards in relation to the period 
after MODSAF became a designated entity.102 The tribunal awarded 
post-award interest in favour of the Ministry. However, under the EU 
Council Regulation, the respondent was effectively prevented from 
                                                          
98 Ved P. Nanda, David K. Pansius and Bryan Neihart, Litigation of International Disputes In U.S. Courts (2d ed. 
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the repayment of debt during the sanctions period. Under these 
circumstances, as IMS argued, it had been legally impossible to 
discharge the debt, and therefore the enforcement of post-award 
interest in relevant part was also impossible. The judgment did not 
consider public policy in much detail; it merely acknowledged the 
respondent’s position that it would be contrary to public policy 
within the meaning of section 103(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996103 
to recognise or enforce the Awards where the EU sanctions prevented 
the same.104 The judgment concentrated instead on the 
interpretation of the relevant EU sanctions instrument.105 This 
interpretation, however, allowed the court to make an unambiguous 
conclusion that the accrual of interest during the sanctions period 
was indeed legally prevented, and therefore the post-award interest 
component of the arbitral awards was unenforceable. Presumably, 
this conclusion had to imply the reliance on section 103(3) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996, i.e. on public policy. 
Generally, dealing with enforcement of awards in favour of 
sanctioned entities, English courts might take into account the 
following. On the one hand, the CJEU’s decision in Eco Swiss made it 
clear that the violation of a mandatory rule of the EU law amounts to 
a violation of public policy. The commentators have interpreted this 
logic as extending to the enforcement of foreign awards and pointed 
out that economic sanctions have all the necessary requisites of a 
relevant mandatory rule.106 On the other hand, a logic similar to that 
adopted by US courts in Ministry of Defense of Iran v. Cubic Defense 
Systems remains possible: if entering a judgment to enforce an 
arbitral award does not amount to making funds available to a 
sanctioned person, there may not be any violation of the sanctions 
regime at all.  
                                                          
103 Equivalent to the New York Convention Article V(2)(b). 
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repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010. 
106 T Szabados (n 30) 459. 
33 
 
Although the latest EU sanctions regulations are better 
developed than many of their predecessors and international 
counterparts, they still leave some ambiguity as to whether the 
making of a court order enforcing an award in favour of a sanctioned 
entity constitutes the ‘making of funds or economic resources 
available, directly or indirectly, to or for a benefit of’ that entity. This 
is one of the key prohibitions within the current EU sanctions regime; 
it is found, for instance, in Article 23 of the Council Regulation (EU) 
No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012. The recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award, including by way of exequatur, features in this 
Regulation’s definition of ‘claim’; and the definition of ‘funds’ 
includes, among other things, ‘claims on money’.107 However, the 
term ‘making available’ is not defined in the Regulation as such. 108 
Given the broad wording of the prohibition, it still seems logical to 
argue that, under those provisions, recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award in Europe in favour of an entity subject to such EU 
sanctions would be barred. However, on the level of court practice, 
this remains to be decided. 
Intentionally or unintentionally, this might leave open the 
possibility of following the US (Cubic) approach in Europe. One could 
say that what takes place under such an arrangement is merely a 
redistribution of assets from an (English or American) company that 
was ‘reckless’ enough to enter into a transaction with a subsequently 
sanctioned entity, to another (English or American) natural or legal 
person with a legitimate claim against a sanctioned entity. From the 
policy perspective, it is not altogether clear if such an outcome would 
be a worse alternative than leaving the funds with the initial debtor. 
Of course, if the English courts are ever to apply similar logic to a 
sovereign State, it will be necessary to find a functional equivalent of 
the ‘terrorist exception’ and the TRIA statutory provisions in the 
English law. Without the intervention of the UK Parliament, such an 
                                                          




outcome seems unlikely – although not altogether improbable. Under 
the current law, the attempts to enforce US court judgments against 
Iran compensating the victims of terrorism in England so far had been 
unsuccessful on the grounds of sovereign immunity.109 It remains to 
be seen whether there could exist any legal obligations enforceable 
in England to make the adoption of such an approach worthwhile. 
 
4. Conclusion 
As the discussion above illustrates, economic sanctions do 
influence the functioning of international commercial arbitration. 
The resolution of many complex procedural matters by arbitral 
tribunals depends ultimately on the prevailing position of national 
courts concerning the objective arbitrability of disputes involving 
sanctions, and their understanding of the public policy defence. 
Based on the existing practice and doctrine, any impact of 
sanctions on arbitrability of disputes seems unjustified. The majority 
of courts and commentators have supported this conclusion. The 
known exceptions from this rule appear to be isolated, and rather 
evidence the unpredictability of any litigation than any consistent 
tendency. The line of authorities disallowing arbitration where the 
parties attempted to use it to avoid the application of sanctions,110 on 
the other hand, is significant and consistent, and is worth keeping in 
mind. However, this jurisprudence is better understood as the use of 
public policy to hold arbitral agreements null and void, rather than as 
any general pronouncement about non-arbitrability of disputes 
involving sanctions. Where the courts, having considered the facts of 
the case, are reasonably certain that the tribunal would properly 
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consider and apply the mandatory sanctions regulations, they will 
normally allow the arbitration to take its course.  
The use of sanctions as a reason for refusing recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards or setting an award aside on the 
grounds of public policy, on the other hand, remains common. The 
public policy argument may be upheld, first and foremost, when the 
award requires a losing party to perform an action expressly 
prohibited by the sanctions. The mere fact of sanctions’ existence and 
their consideration by an arbitral tribunal is insufficient to invoke the 
public policy exception. The courts in some countries, particularly in 
Russia, currently tend to give expansive interpretation to the 
sanctions regulations. In other jurisdictions, including the US and EU, 
the position is more finely balanced, but the courts nevertheless also 
seem prepared to strike down arbitral awards on this ground. 
Parties to commercial agreements must also bear in mind that 
even a court decision to recognise and enforce an arbitral award, in 
the atmosphere of high foreign policy tension, does not in itself 
guarantee the payment of the award debt. As illustrated by the Cubic 
Defense Systems case discussed above, where full-scale economic 
sanctions coexist with the ongoing political tension, a result 
functionally equivalent to a denial of recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award may emerge through an alternative legal 
mechanism. Where the sanctioned entity is a sovereign state, the 
traditional defence of sovereign immunity may still provide some 
protection – but this rule has its exceptions, particularly in the US. 
The unfolding of the same scenario in Europe does not seem very 
likely at the moment, although cannot be excluded altogether.  
Whether the enforcement of arbitral awards in favour of entities 
subject to EU sanctions would be barred in Europe remains to be 
decided in court practice. With cases such as Ministry of Defence & 
Support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v 
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International Military Services Limited111 ongoing, the position may 
become clearer soon. The legal status of funds in the frozen bank 
accounts, the interpretation of the prohibition to ‘make the finds 
available’ to a sanctioned entity, as well as the legal significance of the 
option to request a licence from a competent authority to perform an 
otherwise forbidden transaction, may be the key factors that could 
define the resolution of this issue. 
As the world politics grow more polycentric and the popularity 
of sanctions continues to increase, the questions of arbitrability and 
public policy are bound to keep arising in practice. With the 
accumulation of the states’ regulatory experience, the newer 
generations of more complex sanctions regulations will undoubtedly 
continue to present new challenges for the global arbitration 
community. 
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